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THE ROLE OF OPERATIONAL PAUSE IN WAR TERMINATION

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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PREFACE

During my research I was struck by how little our doctrinal publications have to say about war termination. Our commanders are well provided with advice about rendering the enemy helpless. But our recent wars have not ended that way. We have turned to negotiation while the enemy still retained significant combat power. The soldier has responsibilities during this period of suspension between combat and peace settlement. Decisions made by our commanders can have diplomatic consequences. General Schwarzkopf's decision at the Gulf War ceasefire talks to permit Iraqi helicopter flights is only a recent example

A pause in combat is the operational event most closely associated with negotiations. The operational commander can contribute to diplomacy by skillful execution of the pause. Doctrine should help him do that. Current doctrine does not. I hope that this paper will focus attention on the deficiency.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Clausewitz warned the operational planner that uncertainty and chance play a greater role in war than in any other endeavor.[1] But "every war must end," as Fred Charles Ikle trenchantly observed in the title of his influential book.[2] Since termination is the most certain eventuality in any war, time spent planning for it is never wasted.

Our doctrinal publications put war termination squarely on the operational planner's agenda.[3] Current doctrine instructs the operational planner to design his campaigns with the political aims of the nation firmly in view.[4] He is reminded that his true object is to accomplish these political aims with the minimal amount of combat.[5] But there is little connection between what the extensive literature on war termination tells us about how wars end and the advice offered the operational planner.

Most modern wars do not end with one party hors de combat. Fighting is usually ended by negotiations before the weaker party reaches a state of abject defenselessness.[6] Since we know that all wars will end, and that most wars will end by negotiations, our doctrine should help the operational planner contribute to the negotiating effort.

This paper will focus on an aspect of operational design well suited to bridge the gap between our doctrine and war termination theory. Negotiations to end wars have often been associated with a pause in combat operations. A comparison of the literature on operational pause, war termination, and negotiation with historical cases provides guiding principles for the operational planner.

Chapter II examines operational pause. The operational commander's war termination responsibilities are the subject of Chapter III. Chapter IV surveys the literature describing war termination by negotiation. I suggest principles to guide the operational commander in planning operational pause in Chapter V. These principles are tested against three case studies in Chapter VI. My conclusions and recommendations follow in Chapter VII.

A note on the scope of the paper is appropriate. We have already remarked that negotiation plays a part in ending most wars. In modern times, even a general war resulting in the unconditional surrender of the loser in fact ends with tacit negotiation. The loser, by agreeing to lay down his arms, offers to eliminate the risk of further combat losses to the winner. The winner, by accepting the surrender, agrees not to massacre the loser.[7] But general wars are usually pressed to the point of exhaustion by the parties. At the conclusion of military operations there is little to negotiate but the modalities of capitulation.[8] Instead of operational pause, there is a cessation of hostilities leading directly to a surrender by the

loser and post-conflict activity by the winner. For our purposes, these conflicts are not instructive and will not be considered.

Conflicts at the opposite end of the spectrum, involving "operations other than war," (formerly "low intensity conflict") are equally useless for our study. The diplomatic and economic elements of national power usually dominate negotiations. Military activity is often so infrequent that the concept of operational pause does not apply.[9] Operations other than war are outside the scope of this paper.

The role of the operational pause in termination of limited wars will be our subject. Since these wars are fought in pursuit of limited political aims, the parties are sensitive to the costs of continued military effort. They are likely to weigh these costs against the expected benefits of their limited political goals. When the anticipated costs approach the value of the expected benefits the parties are often ready to modify their political goals as the price for cessation of combat. Termination of these wars is usually reached by compelling the other party to bargain, rather than by completely destroying his ability to resist. This association between bargaining and anxiety about the costs of combat offers the best opportunity to study the relationship between war termination, negotiations and operational pause.

CHAPTER II

OPERATIONAL PAUSE

Operational pause is the planned time phase between offensive operations. Armies do not fight without pause. The uninterrupted struggle required by the logic of war cannot be maintained in practice. Soldiers spend only a small fraction of the period of hostilities locked in combat.

Fear and his bedfellow, indecision, affect the soldier and the commander alike. A thousand excuses can be found for delaying the shock of contact with the enemy. Or the commander may simply be mistaken about the situation, believing that the enemy is too strong to be attacked. Sometimes combat will actually leave the belligerents simultaneously too weak to begin an offensive operation.[10]

Operational pauses may be ordered by commanders in possession of the facts and the forces necessary to continue an offensive. The competent general may perceive that his attack has reached culmination. Operational pause will enable him to recover his strength, receive the enemy's counterattack under the best circumstances, and resume decisive offensive action.[11] Or the political authorities may decide that the cost of continued war exceeds the value of the political object and direct an operational pause leading to negotiations.

Although our forces will spend significant periods in operational pause, our doctrinal publications provide meager

guidance to the operational planner about how or when to employ this tool of operational design. The operational pause is usually treated obliquely, as part of discussion of another operational concept.

The Army's field manual FM 100-5, Operations (1993), discusses operational pause in relation to the concepts of culmination, sequencing, and tempo. The commander is cautioned to avoid pressing an attack beyond culmination - that point in time and space when the attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. Proper synchronization of logistics with combat is suggested as the way to reduce the need for operational pause to regenerate power.[12] FM 100-5 emphasizes the advantages of pressing the operational tempo to a level that the enemy cannot match. But the utility of operational pauses is also addressed. Commanders are urged to consider pauses to collect intelligence, reposition forces, complete resupply, and otherwise ensure the conditions for a subsequent period of high operational tempo.[13]

Operational pause is discussed as a counterpoint to tempo in the Marine Corps publication FMFM 1-1, Campaigning. We are reminded that our operational tempo must be measured against the tempo generated by the enemy. A high tempo need only be faster than what the enemy can achieve. Unnecessary combat should be avoided. While it is true that all fighting reduces the enemy's strength by attrition, it is almost always wiser to use the time

for a pause to prepare for high tempo combat at a decisive place and time.[14]

The Department of the Navy has issued the first in a series of six publications establishing departmental doctrine for the Navy and Marine Corps. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare includes a discussion of tempo. But the complementary concept of operational pause is not discussed.[15]

Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force is the source of aerospace doctrine for the Department of the Air Force. A persistent, relentless air offensive is the theme throughout this manual's treatment of operational design. The occasional requirement for a defensive air posture is acknowledged, but only to regenerate friendly air power after a period of high-tempo offensives or to provide operational protection during an especially risky phase of the campaign.[16]

The Joint Staff has published operational doctrine in Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Joint Force Commanders are urged to consider operational pause as an alternative to continuous offensives when the forces for decisive action are unavailable. A pause, regeneration of combat power, and subsequent decisive action is the recommended operational design. Significantly, Joint Pub 3-0 goes on to note that the Joint Force Commander may be required to employ operational pause for political reasons. Caring for displaced persons in the operational area is the example provided.[17]

With the exception of Joint Pub 3-0, our doctrinal treatments of operational pause view it as a purely military device; a useful phase in a sequence of operations leading to the enemy's defeat in the field. The doctrine does not associate operational pause with war termination.

CHAPTER III

WAR TERMINATION

At the core of all modern discourse about war termination is Clauzewitz's observation that war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.[18] Our political leaders are advised to consider what they intend to achieve by war before they begin hostilities. We know that in wars for limited political goals we would be prudent to keep our expenditures in line with the benefits we expect to gain. Our political goals should change if they no longer bear a reasonable relationship to our costs. We understand that diplomacy continues between states even when they are at war, and that offers to make peace are often advantageous to both parties long before either has reached the point of exhaustion. We know, in other words, that political considerations will often dictate a negotiated end to war before military operations have run to their logical conclusion. How do our doctrinal publications help the operational commander plan for war termination under these circumstances?

FM 100-5 provides a concise list of war termination planning factors for the operational commander. The authors insist that the most important requirement is a clear understanding of the nation's overall policy goals. The commander must focus on ending the conflict in a way that will contribute to these policy goals. His role in providing critical information to political decision-makers about the enemy's capacity for continued

resistance is described. Finally, the commander is advised to conduct operations aimed directly at the enemy's ongoing calculations of the cost and risk of continued fighting. Operations conducted according to this prescription should produce an enemy both unable and unwilling to continue the war.[19]

FMFM 1-1 does not address war termination directly, except to note that limited political goals for war can make it difficult to discern the military conditions leading to the desired end state. But there is no discussion of war termination while our enemy is still capable of significant fighting.[20]

A direct treatment of war termination is also absent from Naval Doctrine Publication 1. The authors imply that war termination will happen after decisive combat has destroyed the enemy's will or capacity to resist. Since protracted war can cause undesirable political and economic consequences, the commander is urged to get to war termination as rapidly as possible. But the only recognized path to that goal is military victory.[21]

Air Force Manual 1-1 includes an essay on war's function as an instrument of politics. The authors assert that military victory, usually accomplished by destroying the enemy's capability or will to continue fighting, is not necessarily the same as success in war. Successful war termination can only be attained by accomplishing the nation's political objectives. But cost and benefit calculations often discourage the effort required for outright victory in limited wars. The authors call

for an orchestration of all the instruments of national power to accomplish war termination. They do not suggest how the operational commander can contribute anything other than victory.[22]

Joint Pub 3-0 includes a discussion of war termination as part of the Joint Force Commander's considerations for his operational design. The authors emphasize the primacy of political aims, and assert that successful war termination must include accomplishing these aims. The political leadership and the Joint Force Commander have reciprocal responsibilities. Political leaders must furnish the operational commander with the political end state they desire, and the operational commander must provide politicians with the critical information they need about the condition of enemy and friendly forces so that informed reassessments of political goals can be made. The authors assert that the fundamental aim of military operations is to render the enemy incapable of resistance. But they also acknowledge the utility of negotiation to end war. Joint Force Commanders are urged to consider the impact of operations on the enemy's judgement of the cost and risk of continued war.[23]

Suppose the commander takes this advice. His operations persuade the enemy to negotiate. What is the operational commander likely to see when the diplomats move to the peace table?

CHAPTER IV

NEGOTIATING WAR TERMINATION

Not long ago the operational commander could expect a certain formality about negotiations for peace. With authority from their political leaders in hand, the opposing field commanders would arrange a ceasefire. Diplomats would negotiate an armistice describing the rights and responsibilities of the parties and their armed forces during the resulting cessation of hostilities. With the fighting over, the political leaders would move on to the task of conflict resolution. Given agreement on a post-war settlement, a peace treaty could be signed.

But communist regimes scored impressive successes by dispensing with the traditional formula. Fighting while negotiating gets concessions, as the Serbs are proving today in Bosnia. Operational commanders will face this technique in the future. In limited wars the parties are likely to begin negotiations before they are in clear and present danger of military collapse, so we should not be surprised when they seek more than peace at the bargaining table. In these circumstances negotiation and diplomacy tend to be themselves acts of war aimed at changing the balance of power between the contending parties. Diplomacy becomes the continuation of war with other means.[24]

Why do political leaders seek negotiations even though they are capable of continued fighting? The most obvious motivation comes from changed political goals. Political leaders may

decide, based on rational calculation, that the game is not worth the candle and try to get the best deal possible.[25]

Statesmen may also seek negotiations because they see an advantage in delay. This can be true of both the stronger and the weaker party. The weaker state may expect to gain strength during any operational pause that can be obtained during negotiations. Likewise, a stronger state may calculate that it has a comparative advantage in regeneration of combat power, and that its advantage will be even greater after a delay.

Leaders sometimes enter negotiations to influence the enemy's domestic politics. Negotiations may encourage a peace party or undermine the enemy's current regime. Better terms might be possible with new enemy leadership.

Conversely, negotiations are often important to domestic support for the war effort. It is difficult for governments to maintain popular support during a war if the leadership refuses to even discuss peace.

Negotiations may be attractive to statesmen confronted by enemy escalation they cannot match. A settlement on acceptable terms may be out of reach, but perhaps limitations on the conduct of the war can be negotiated.

Talks may be the price for allied cooperation. If a state cannot win without allies, lowered political goals and negotiations will be required if demanded by coalition partners.

Finally, if an acceptable diplomatic settlement appears unlikely, a party may seek concessions designed to shape the

battlefield for subsequent decisive combat. Withdrawal from key terrain, or ceasefire conditions supporting a surprise attack may be concealed as innocent steps to a political solution.[26]

Although political leaders have many incentives to negotiate an end to limited wars, negotiations are difficult to start. The wartime behavior of governments builds formidable barriers to diplomacy.

It is often hard to start talking to the enemy because efforts to build domestic support for the war have exaggerated the value of the war aims. The political goals common to limited wars are rarely enough to inspire great sacrifice, so governments frequently justify these wars as necessary to protect vital moral or economic interests. This practice raises two barriers to negotiations. First, it is difficult to signal the enemy that you are willing to talk while simultaneously convincing the army and population that fundamental values are at stake. And second, the people may not accept the idea of negotiations and force a change in policy.

Another barrier to starting negotiations is simple reluctance to make the first move. Making the first offer is popularly seen as suing for peace. Political leaders are afraid that this perceived sign of weakness will incline the enemy to drive a harder bargain at the peace table. Reluctance to move first is, paradoxically, most often a problem for the state that is weaker, and thus most in need of a negotiated settlement.[27]

The literature recognizes that military action can overcome barriers to successful negotiation. Concessions may be wrung from a stubborn adversary by threats of military escalation. The commander can support the diplomatic threat by demonstrations indicating readiness to escalate. If threats do not produce concessions, escalation in fact may yield results. The commander can increase the level of violence by using new weapons, expanding the target list, or conducting operations in new areas. Successful escalation requires sudden application of a significant increase in violence. Once escalation has been applied, the new level of violence must be maintained. Any decrease in pressure allows the enemy to regenerate combat power.[28]

The commander may also produce enemy concessions by operations designed to display determination to continue fighting. This is different from escalation because it does not imply a change in the nature of the conflict. The object is to convince the enemy that you have the will and means to persevere, and that prolonging negotiations will only bring continued losses. Increasing the tempo of operations during negotiations is a way to display determination.[29]

The military operations just described influence the enemy's diplomacy indirectly by increasing his calculation of the costs of continued war. The commander may also be required to contribute directly to the negotiations by seizing territory useful for bargaining.[30]

CHAPTER V

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

It is worth repeating that most modern limited wars have ended with a negotiated settlement, and that the negotiations were frequently preceded by operational pause.[31] The Korean War is a salient example. Current doctrine does not reflect the factual linkage between these concepts. If we examine the interface between operational pause, war termination, and negotiation we discover the following guiding principles for the operational commander.

The cardinal rule is the requirement for the commander to make war termination the lodestar of his operational idea. To do this the commander must establish a reciprocal relationship with his political leadership. The politician must provide the operational commander with a clear idea of the desired political end state. The operational commander must provide the political leadership with information about battlefield conditions required for an assessment of the costs and benefits of continued fighting. Only close cooperation can avoid missed opportunities for early settlement.[32]

If the political leadership decides that a negotiated settlement is the best solution, the operational commander may be asked to execute an operational pause to encourage negotiations. The operational commander must offer advice at this point on a crucial issue: Does he have a comparative advantage in

regenerating military power, or does the enemy have that advantage? Who will gain in relative military strength during a pause in offensive operations? If the enemy can regenerate faster, the commander should advise against operational pause. The enemy will have no incentive to settle, since his relative position improves with delay. A display of determination by increasing the tempo of offensive operations is more likely to encourage negotiations.

If the commander is directed to execute a pause his operational idea must address certain key objectives. His plan must provide for operational protection. An operational pause directed by politics and not by the logic of the battlefield can be risky. The enemy may have the resources and desire to take the offensive during the pause.

Regeneration of combat power at the most rapid rate possible is imperative. Every step must be taken to prepare for subsequent high-tempo offensive operations. In addition to resupply, forces must be repositioned, intelligence must be collected, and planning for sequels to the operational pause must be completed.

Operations designed to gain political advantage during the pause should be conducted. Special operations to encourage political opposition to continued war may be directed at the enemy.[33]

Sequels to the pause should include operations to seize territory for use as bargaining chips. Close cooperation with the negotiators is required to make these plans effective.

Plans for escalation following the operational pause should be made. The political leadership may require that preparation for escalation operations be transparent to the enemy. Rehearsals and demonstrations may be necessary so that the threat of escalation can be employed before the actual escalation is ordered. Escalation from an operational pause must be sudden and significant. Once escalation is undertaken, the commander should advise against subsequent operational pauses. They are usually counterproductive because the enemy uses them to regenerate combat power.

The enemy leadership may calculate that continued fighting is in their interest, or the passions of war may lead them into an irrational decision to refuse negotiations.[34] They may come to the peace table but fail to negotiate. To deal with these possibilities the operational pause plan must have as a sequel a sequence of operations leading to a military decision. The commander must prepare the force to execute the offensive sequels on short notice. Close coordination with the political leadership may enable the diplomats to shape the battlefield to fit the offensive sequels. Operational deception keyed to the offensive sequels must be ongoing during the pause.

Sound guidance should be validated by experience. War termination in three recent wars shows that these principles have been applied successfully.

CHAPTER VI

CASE STUDIES

Many limited wars display linkage between operational pause and war termination by negotiation. The three cases discussed in this chapter are illustrative.

The Korean War

In March of 1951 the United Nations forces advanced on the 38th parallel for the second time. The Truman administration had already decided that the limited goal of a restored South Korea was all that could be achieved at reasonable cost. Stalemate and return to the status quo was acceptable. The administration wanted to end the war on these terms through negotiation.[35]

The operational commander, General Matthew Ridgway, advised that the Chinese Army had suffered heavy losses during the latest United Nations offensive. But he was convinced that they were capable of a strong defense in the rough terrain north of the 38th parallel. He predicted an increase in his casualties during any offensive designed to drive the Chinese out of Korea. Finally, Ridgway noted that his air power would be less effective at supply interdiction as the enemy lines of communication into China grew shorter.[36]

The administration directed General Ridgway to execute an operational pause at the Kansas/Wyoming line, a defensive position just north of the 38th parallel. Offers to negotiate were extended. The Chinese and North Koreans accepted. Military

representatives met to discuss an armistice, but there was no ceasefire. The parties continued fighting while negotiating.[37]

General Ridgway considered operational protection during the pause. Defensive positions were prepared and air operations designed to prevent the Chinese from reconstituting combat power were pressed home.[38] General Ridgway also conducted operations to seize territory for use as bargaining chips during negotiations. Operations Talons, Cudgel and Wrangler were directed at key terrain in the Punchbowl and Iron Triangle areas.[39] General Ridgway also planned for a campaign to drive the Chinese north of the narrow waist of the peninsula. Operation Overwhelming called for an advance to a line from Pyongyang to Wonsan.[40]

The Chinese were not at a comparative disadvantage in regeneration of combat power. The limited American resources available for the Korean theater set a ceiling on 8th Army power that the Chinese could match. They reformed and supplied their armies. Consolidated in good defensive positions, they had little incentive to compromise. They prolonged the negotiations and carried out offensive operations with political objectives. Chinese attacks on South Korean units were designed to split the United Nations coalition. Continued attacks on United States positions caused high American casualties and put increasing pressure on the Truman administration to settle. President Eisenhower finally made the risk of continued fighting unacceptable for the Chinese by threatening nuclear escalation.

The credibility of the threat was enhanced by transparent preparations when nuclear weapons were moved to Okinawa.[41] An armistice was signed.

General Ridgway's execution of operational pause at the Kansas/Wyoming line was sound. He protected his army, prepared it to resume the offensive, executed the required operations directed at the negotiators, and had reasonable plans for a decisive campaign sequel. The pause did help start negotiations. But the political decision to pause at the Kansas/Wyoming line was based on a flawed appraisal of the Chinese cost and benefit calculation. President Truman underestimated Chinese toleration for casualties and overestimated their desire for a settlement. A credible threat of escalation by a new administration was required to get the Communists to agree to an armistice.[42]

FIGURE 1

THE KOREAN WAR - STALEMATE AND CEASEFIRE, 1951-53



Source: Matthew B. Ridgeway, The Korean War (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967), p. 137.

The Sino-Indian War

In 1962 the Sino-Indian border dispute in the Tibetan mountains suddenly became a crisis. The border was established along the McMahon Line, drawn by a British surveyor. The actual position of the line was disputed. The Chinese wanted a negotiated settlement.[43] The Indian government, under pressure from public opinion and underestimating chinese military power, refused to negotiate and continued a policy of establishing military posts in the disputed area.

The Chinese decided to resist the Indian forward military policy. In September of 1962 the Chinese Army established blocking positions opposite the Indian position at Dhola Post below Thag La Ridge. The Chinese positions were in territory claimed by China.[44]

The Indian government demanded a Chinese withdrawal, and made well publicized preparations to drive the Chinese out. Indian politicians stated unambiguously that India would attack. Newspapers predicted an offensive.[45] An Indian brigade took up positions on the Nyamjang Chu river and prepared to attack the Chinese on the opposite side.

The Chinese struck first on October 20, 1962. They drove the Indians south in disorder. By October 25th, the Indians had been driven from all their northern posts. The Chinese initiated an operational pause and offered a ceasefire. They proposed that the parties withdraw their armed forces 20 kilometers from the

line of actual military control in 1959 and negotiate a settlement.[46]

The Indian government refused to negotiate without a Chinese commitment to accept the Indian interpretation of the border. The Indian army was directed by the government to set up a defense at the mountain pass at Se La. The government made clear that India would counterattack.

During the pause and exchange of diplomatic notes both armies resupplied. The Chinese were closer to their bases and held a distinct advantage in moving troops and supplies to the battlefield. They also repaired a military road through the Bailey trail to the east of Se La and concentrated forces in that sector. On November 17th the Chinese attacked again. They moved a large force down the Bailey Trail, outflanking the Indian position at Se La. Defensive positions at Dirang Dzong and Bomdi La were taken by storm and the Indian army collapsed in a rout. The survivors fled south in small parties to the plains of Assam. No organized Indian military force remained in the frontier area.[47]

On November 20th, the Chinese government announced a unilateral ceasefire and stated that the Chinese Army would withdraw 20 kilometers north of the 1959 line. All captured Indian troops and equipment would be returned. The Indian Army was expected to station troops no closer than 20 kilometers south of the 1959 line. The Chinese reserved the right to attack again if India did not comply with these terms.[48] Public opinion

prevented formal Indian acceptance of these terms, but they complied in practice.[49]

Chinese political goals in this border dispute were very limited as demonstrated by their offer to negotiate during their first operational pause in October. The Chinese clearly hoped that the pause would encourage the Indian government to accept a compromise solution. The Chinese army was well placed to execute a pause. They were closer to their supply base, and their investment in military roads along the frontier enabled them to increase their already superior military strength at a much faster rate than could the Indians. The Chinese also used the pause to redeploy and prepare their forces for an offensive sequel. At the direction of their political leadership they launched a decisive offensive operation that collapsed all the Indian forces in the theater. The operational pause on October 25th did not bring negotiations with India. But the Chinese had correctly determined that their military position would improve during the pause. They were prepared to return to combat when the pause did not produce the desired result.

FIGURE 2

THE SINO-INDIAN WAR: CHINESE ATTACKS
OCT-NOV, 1962



Source: Neville Maxwell, India's China War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), p. 416.

The Yom Kippur War

President Sadat of Egypt staked his political future on a plan to break the stalemate over the territory occupied by Israel during the 1967 war. The Egyptians established a coalition with Syria and Jordan and secured support from the Soviet Union. The political objective was limited to recovery of the occupied territories.[50]

The Egyptian planners' operational idea called for two phases. During the first offensive phase the army would cross the Suez Canal and penetrate the Israeli defensive line on a broad front. There would follow an operational pause during which beachheads would be consolidated. The Soviet Union would press for a ceasefire and negotiations.[51] The Syrian plan was similar. They planned to seize the Golan Heights, consolidate and await a political settlement.[52]

The Egyptian attack on October 6th, 1973 achieved its initial objectives. The army successfully crossed the canal, overwhelmed the defenders and consolidated in defensive beachheads. Israeli counterattacks on the Egyptian positions were thrown back.[53] The Syrian attack was also initially successful. They penetrated deep into Israeli positions on the Golan.[54] But the situation did not develop as the Arabs expected. The Israelis adopted a defensive posture in the Sinai and concentrated their effort on the northern front. They counterattacked on the Golan and drove the Arab forces back on

Damascus. President Assad's pleas for help caused the Egyptians to leave their defensive positions on the 14th of October and attack the passes at Gidi, Mitla and Bir Gafgafa.[55] The Israelis held, and subsequently crossed onto the west bank of the canal, cutting off the Egyptian Third Army.

Soviet efforts to impose a ceasefire were not well coordinated with the Arabs and did not begin in earnest until after the failure of the Egyptian attacks on the Sinai passes.[56] The disaster facing the Third Army became clear to the Soviets by the 20th of October. Their frantic efforts to impose a ceasefire were apparently successful on the 22nd of October when the Security Council called for a ceasefire. But both Israelis and Egyptians sought to strengthen their positions on the ground in advance of the negotiations. An effective ceasefire was not secured until the 24th of October.[57]

The operational pause for negotiations planned by Syria never developed. The Israelis counterattacked before the Syrian Army obtained its objectives. The Egyptians retained the initiative in the Sinai because it was at the time an economy of force sector for Israel. Their operational pause took place, but the Egyptians miscalculated the speed with which the Israelis would deal with the Syrians and redeploy combat power in Sinai. The expected Soviet diplomatic initiative came too late. Their diplomatic efforts could not produce a ceasefire until after the Israelis obtained a crucial bargaining chip by cutting off the Third Army. The stalemate was broken, but the conditions for the

resulting negotiations were not as favorable as planned by the Arabs.

Both the Syrians and Egyptians planned offensive sequels if negotiations were not satisfactory. The Syrians never had an opportunity to put their plan into effect, and the Egyptians were forced to launch their second offensive on the Sinai passes to rescue their allies.

The Arab operational pause was not intended to persuade the Israelis to negotiate. The pause was to provide time for the Soviet Union to force negotiations on Israel and to avoid exposing the Arab armies to defeat in mobile combat. Arab operational plans for the pause were competently done, but the decision to execute the pause was unsound. The Arabs underestimated the Israeli ability to regenerate combat power. During the Egyptian pause the Israelis defeated Syria, redeployed to the Sinai, and launched an effective counterattack. The Arabs were forced to accept a ceasefire without the political settlement they desired.

FIGURE 3

THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
NORTHERN FRONT: ISRAELI COUNTERATTACK
OCT. 12-22, 1973



30

Source: Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1975), p. 131.

FIGURE 4

THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
SOUTHERN FRONT: CEASEFIRE
OCT. 24, 1973



Source: Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1975), p. 237.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Three factors stand out in evaluating any operational pause to encourage negotiations on war termination. First, an accurate assessment of the enemy's relative ability to regenerate combat power is crucial. The party at a disadvantage in the regeneration race will find operational pause counterproductive. The party with the advantage gains in relative strength every day and has no military incentive to make concessions. He will prolong the negotiations until prepared for another round of combat. Unless military or diplomatic pressure from a third party can be relied upon to force negotiations, the party at a regeneration disadvantage should avoid operational pause and seek concessions through fighting. On the other hand, the party with an advantage should consider operational pause and offers to negotiate. If an acceptable settlement results, the war can be ended efficiently. If not, combat can be resumed. The advice of the operational commander will be crucial to a correct decision on the suitability of operational pause. The operational commander should anticipate the possibility of a pause and focus his intelligence collection on the enemy's regeneration capability.

Second, operational pause aimed at encouraging negotiation is risky. Such a pause usually occurs before combat has been

pressed as far as possible, leaving the enemy with some combat power. The operational commander must give strict attention to operational protection. Intelligence collection must be focused on the enemy's capability to attack during the pause. If the enemy retains significant combat power, but is at a regeneration disadvantage, he may strike to avoid falling farther behind. Negotiations may be part of his deception plan.

Finally, any plan for an operational pause must provide for a sequel if negotiations fail. If an acceptable settlement cannot be reached through negotiation, it will have to be forced through combat. Intelligence may indicate an enemy attack during the pause, making a preemptive strike appropriate. Or it may be determined that the decision to pause and seek negotiations was an error because the enemy has a regeneration advantage. Combat may be the only way to retrieve the situation. The operational commander is responsible for evaluating the battlefield situation and advising his political leadership about these eventualities.

Operational commanders will face the prospect of pauses directed at negotiations in the future. If we are committed to two simultaneous major regional contingencies our political leadership may elect to deal with one conflict through negotiation so that forces can be deployed to the other conflict. As our force structure is reduced, negotiated settlement of limited wars will become more attractive because it permits conservation of scarce resources.

Operational commanders should be supported by a complete doctrinal treatment of these issues. All service doctrine should directly address the war termination responsibilities of the operational commander. The relationship between operational pause and war termination negotiations is a necessary part of this doctrine.

An effective doctrine of operational pause will alert the commander to his responsibilities. He must provide sound advice to his political leadership about the importance of the regeneration advantage. Provisions for operational protection must be made. Sequels for seizing bargaining chips, for escalation, and for a decisive follow-on offensive are all required. The operational commander must not treat these pauses as interludes without military purpose. Guided by correct doctrine, he can contribute directly to successful combination of military and diplomatic power.

NOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 101.

2. Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).

3. See U.S. Army Dept., FM 100-5, Operations (Washington: 1993), Chap. 3, p. 11.

4. Ibid., p. 6-23.

5. U.S. Navy Dept., FMFM 1-1, Campaigning (Washington: 1990), P. 26.

6. Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 16.

7. See Joseph McMillan, "Talking to the Enemy: Negotiations in Wartime," Comparative Strategy, Volume 11, Number 4, October-December 1992, p. 448; and Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 126, 136.

8. For a discussion of capitulations, see Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla, War, Ends and Means (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1989), p. 254.

9. For a discussion of the role of military force in termination of operations other than war, see Paul Lee Jr., "War Termination in a Low-Intensity Conflict," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1988, p. 14.

10. Clausewitz, pp. 216-218.

11. Ibid., p. 528.

12. FM 100-5, Operations, Chap. 6, p. 9.

13. Ibid., Chap. 7, p. 3.

14. FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, pp. 26, 74.

15. U.S. Navy Dept., Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare (Washington: 1994), pp. 40-43.

16. See U.S. Air Force Dept., Air Force Manual 1-1, Volume II, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force (Washington: 1992), p. 142.

17. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington: 1993), Chap. III, p. 20.

18. Clausewitz, p. 69.

19. FM 100-5, Operations, Chap. 6, p. 23.

20. FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, p. 35.

21. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, p. 35.

22. Air Force Manual 1-1, v. II, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, pp. 1-5.

23. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Chap. III, pp. 30-32.

24. Seabury and Codevilla, p. 251.

25. For a model describing how these decisions are made see Michael I. Handel, War Termination - A critical Survey (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1978), pp. 32-41.

26. McMillan, pp. 450-451.

27. Pillar, pp. 65-69.

28. McMillan, p. 454.

29. Pillar, pp. 185-186.

30. Ibid., p. 189.

31. For an historical study supporting this premise see Robert F. Randle, The Origins of Peace - A Study of Peacemaking and the Structure of Peace Settlements (New York: The Free Press, 1973), pp. 24-83.

32. Stephen J. Cimbala, Force and Diplomacy in the Future (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), p. 220.

33. For an argument that these operations rarely work see Ibid., p. 73.

34. For a description of military leadership incapable of recognizing defeat see Matome Ugaki, Fading Victory - The Diary

of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941-1945, trans. Masataka Chihaya (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1991), pp. 623-666.

35. Callum A. MacDonald, Korea, The War Before Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1986), p. 91.

36. See Ibid., pp. 114-115 and Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967), pp. 116-123.

37. Ridgway, pp. 177-183.

38. MacDonald, p. 238.

39. Ridgway, pp. 185-191.

40. Ibid., p. 187.

41. Pillar, pp. 183-184.

42. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 95-97.

43. Neville Maxwell, India's China War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), p. 148.

44. Ibid., p. 298.

45. Ibid., p. 319.

46. Ibid., pp. 373-374.

47. Ibid., pp. 405-408.

48. Ibid., pp. 417-423.

49. For an account of the political obstacles preventing the Indian government from negotiating see V. B. Karnik, ed., China Invades India (Bombay: Allied Publishers Private LTD., 1963), pp. 229-266.

50. Edgar O'Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), p. 37.

51. Ibid., p. 186 and Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1975), p. 37.

52. Herzog, p. 77.

53. Ibid., pp. 189-193.

54. Ibid., p. 101.

55. Ibid., p. 135.

56. Ibid., p. 244.

57. Ibid., p. 250.

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